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Resumen: Este artículo discute la tesis de Carl Hoefer en su artículo 
‗Freedom from the inside out‘: para hacer el universo-bloque compatible 
con la voluntad libre, basta con evitar las intuiciones presentistas que 
asociamos intuitivamente con acciones libres. Mostramos una posible 
dificultad de esta propuesta: si partimos del universo-bloque, ciertas 
acciones libres podrían quedar ligadas de un modo incompatible con la 
libertad. Esto se muestra de una forma gráfica que a menudo se utiliza 
para discutir la libertad en el universo-bloque, mediante un experimento 
mental con máquinas del tiempo. Esta dificultad no depende de la 
existencia real de tales máquinas. 
Palabras clave: El tiempo en el universo-bloque, Experimentos mentales 
con viajes en el tiempo, La voluntad libre en el universo-bloque. 
Abstract: This paper discusses Carl Hoefer‘s thesis in his article 
‗Freedom from the inside out‘: to make the block universe compatible with 
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free-will, one must avoid presentist intuitions intuitively associated to free 
actions. We show a possible difficulty of this proposal: the assumption of 
the block universe can imply that certain free actions would be cross-
linked in a way incompatible with freedom. This is shown in a graphical 
way often used in the discussion of freedom in the block universe, by 
means of a thought experiment with time machines. This difficulty does 
not depend on the real existence of those machines. 
Keywords: Time in the block universe, Time travel thought experiments, 
Free will in the block universe. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Since Einstein‘s theories of special and general relativity were 
accepted by the scientific community, a good deal (perhaps most) of the 
specialists in this branch of physics have favored the world image called the 
block universe. According to this conception, the special relationship 
between present and existence which seems to derive from our ordinary 
experience, –which is asserted by the most opposite time theory, the 
presentist theory,– is just an illusion. In reality, every point in space-time 
making up the universe would exist a-temporally (as a block); given a 
reference system, the only temporal relations with a physical significance 
would be before and after: and the temporal modes past and future would 
just designate certain points of the a-temporal block which are not 
accessible (no longer, or not yet) from a given point.
1
 
                                                 
1) For simplicity, in this article we refer to the presentist theory as the alternative to the block 
universe, because it is the most opposite to the latter, with regard to the relationship between time 
and existence. While the block universe theory postulates that all points of spacetime exist in the 
same way, timelessly, the presentist theory postulates that only the present exists, however 
defined. To be precise, it is important to keep in mind that the presentist theory is actually a 
representative of a larger family of conceptions of time which argue that existence is linked to type 
A time series (past, present and future series). Another representative of this family of proposals, 
for example, is the so-called ―growing block‖ conception, according to which the past and the 
present do exist (in fact, the present would be the point of coming into existence), while the future 
does not yet exist. With respect to the arguments developed in this article, it is not important which 
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Among the discussions motivated by this world image, one of the first 
was its compatibility or incompatibility with human freedom. That this 
problem was posed, was logical: if every point in space-time, with its 
material contents, exists a-temporally, the future (however we define it) is as 
real, and therefore as rigidly defined, as the present or the past. In this 
scenario, how would it be possible to fit the idea that man‘s free decisions 
determine (or co-determine) world events? What is the meaning of terms 
such as options, decisions, unrealized possibilities, and so forth, in the 
context of the block universe? 
The most relevant attempt in recent literature to confront these 
questions was made by Carl Hoefer, especially in his article ‗Freedom from 
the inside out‘.
2
 Our paper attempts to show a possible difficulty in Hoefer‘s 
approach, derived from the fact that, in the block universe, it is possible (in 
theory) to entangle pairs of actions in such a way that they do not appear 
compatible with the idea that those actions are free.  
To show this difficulty in an easy way, we shall employ a graphical 
procedure which has been used frequently in the discussion of the problem 
of free will in the block universe: thought experiments consistent with time-
travel to the past. The reason for this can be shown in three steps: 
First, we must remember that time travel (specially a trip to the past, or 
a two-way trip) would only be possible in the block universe. In the 
presentist alternative, the past does not exist; therefore traveling to the past 
makes no sense.
3
 On the contrary, in the block universe, a two-way trip in 
time is nothing but a temporal closed curve inside the a-temporal existence 
block, and it is well-known that at least some solutions of Einstein‘s field 
equations give rise to temporal closed curves.  
                                                                                                       
of the versions of this family is considered most appropriate, because all of them share the same 
decisive point for the issue discussed here: the causal priority of the past with respect to the 
future, derived from its precedence in existence. 
2) Carl Hoefer, ―Freedom from the inside out‖, Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement Vol. 50 
(March 2002), 201-222. DOI: 10.1017/S1358246100010572.  
3) Most specialists in the philosophy of time agree with this statement. However, even a thesis 
apparently so obvious as this has been questioned. See, for example: Bradley Monton, 
―Presentists can believe in closed timelike curves‖ Analysis 63/3 (2003): 199–202.  
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As a second step, if we allow that temporal closed curves can exist in a 
block universe, time travel could bring us to situations where human 
freedom and the consistency of the world could clash. The typical, best-
known and well-discussed case is the grandfather paradox, where a time 
traveler decides to kill her grandfather before he came to know her 
grandmother. If this were possible, the existence of the time traveler in time 
would become inconsistent. But why wouldn‘t she be able to do it? 
Three, although these thought experiments are formulated in terms of 
time-machines, they are actually independent of the possibility that these 
machines can really exist or not.
4
 Their real use is the fact that they make it 
possible to present intuitively the consequences of closed temporal loops 
that include human actions in the events they enclose. Whether these 
temporal curves can be artificially generated is not relevant here. We are 
only interested in the fact that a generic block universe could contain them.
5
 
What we intend, therefore, is present the graphical resource of a new 
variant in the family of thought experiments about time travel to try and 
throw a little more light on the discussion on the compatibility of free will with 
the block universe. In particular, we will try to use this variant of the 
experiment to formulate a possible difficulty for Carl Hoefer‘s recent defense 
of the compatibility of free will and determinism in the context of the block 
universe. 
For this goal, the remainder of the article will be divided in the following 
way: 
In the second section, we shall summarize the classical objection to 
the compatibility of the block universe with free will –the grandfather 
paradox– and the most significant answers it has received. We‘ll conclude 
                                                 
4) About the state of the art in the discussion about the actual possibility of the existence of time-
machines, and their importance for the discussion on the philosophical aspects of the theories of 
space-time, see John Earmanc, Wüthrich Christian and John Manchak, ―Time machines‖, in The 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (Summer 2016 Edition), ed. Edward Zalta, URL: 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2016/entries/time-machine/. (Last time consulted March 
2016).  
5) This result was established in Kurt Gödel, ―An example of a new type of cosmological solutions 
of Einstein‘s field equations of gravitation‖ Reviews of Modern Physics 21 (1949): 447-450. 
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that the most promising answer is the one that sees the problem of this 
paradox as an inconsistent mix of the presentist theory of time with the 
scenario of the block universe. In this section we‘ll follow mainly Paul J. 
Nahin‘s analysis. 
In the third section we‘ll outline a proposal which tries to fit together the 
block universe with free will, starting from the same intuition used in the 
case of the grandfather paradox in the previous section. This is Carl 
Hoefer‘s proposal, which presents freedom as co-determination, where all 
the decisions taken in every instant come together.  
In the fourth section we‘ll try to show with the help of new thought 
experiments about time travel, that Hoefer‘s proposal does not take into 
account the possibility of action entanglement incompatible with freedom in 
the block universe. These experiments will show that in the block universe 
the most elementary actions could be entangled with other actions in the 
past or the future, in such a way that the idea of free decision is such 
situations makes no sense. 
2. Time travel and free-will: the grandfather paradox 
Since Hermann Minkowski reformulated special relativity in 1908 in 
terms of a four-dimensional continuum, the way was open to conceive the 
universe as an a-temporal block. If this perspective is accepted, it makes 
sense to pose the possibility of a trip from any point to another one, in the 
subset of points of that continuum causally connected to a given point. 
However, moving from one point to another in that subset would mean, in 
many cases, not just space travel, but time travel too. Is this possible? The 
development of general relativity theory and, above all, the discovery that 
there are solutions of the field equations of this theory which describe closed 
temporal curves, seem to indicate that, at least in some circumstances, the 
answer could be positive. 
The idea of time travel was popular much before the technical 
developments that suggested its possibility in the block universe. This idea 
gave rise to a science-fiction genre and simultaneously to a still standing 
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controversy about the supposed or real paradoxes that those travels would 
generate. One of these paradoxes, the grandfather paradox, suggests that 
human freedom is inconsistent with time travel, thus indirectly pointing at an 
inconsistency of human action and the block universe. 
The first formulation of the grandfather paradox is usually attributed to 
the French writer René Barjavel, who developed it in his novel Le Voyageur 
imprudent (1943). However, the paradox is mentioned as a well-known 
concept in a letter published in the magazine Amazing Stories (February 
1931), in the following words: 
‗[I]f time traveling were a possibility there would be no need for some 
scientist getting a headache trying to invent an instrument or ―Time-
Machine‖ to ―go back and kill grandpa‖ (in answer to the age-old 
arguments of preventing your birth by killing your grandparents I would 
say: ―who the heck would want to kill his grandpa or grandma!‖)‘.
6
 
Of course, the problem is not whether someone would have the idea of 
doing something like that, but if they would be able to do it.  
It looks, therefore, that a travel to the past would imply a restriction to 
the actions that the travelers could perform. Concretely, they could never do 
anything that would break somehow the logical consistency of their own 
cosmic line, and therefore of space-time. The question is: what does this 
restriction mean? In other words, how will the contradiction be avoided? In a 
contingent way? (e.g. the murdered misses). As the result of a physical 
effect? (i.e. an irresistible impulse). 
In the first case, it would seem that time travel in the block universe is 
incompatible with human freedom, since what the agents decide does not 
depend only on their will, but on other external circumstances. However, 
time travelers who discover their errors could in principle try out once and 
again. How can we accept the scenario of a continual casual frustration of 
their murderous (or suicidal) attempts? This brings us to the more intriguing 
proposal that certain actions will not be performed, not because of external 
circumstances, but as a result of a pre-determination of the traveler‘s will. 
                                                 
6) Quoted in Paul Nahin, Time Machines (New York: Springer, 1999): 255. 
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The time travelers would plan their action assuming that they are free, but in 
the final attempt their mind would necessarily decide not to do it, thus 
proving that free will would be illusory in certain circumstances. But it would 
be hard to believe that time travel causes a loss of free will. And, as the 
actions to be performed are ordinary human actions, the conclusion would 
be that free will must be an illusion... at least in the context of the block 
universe. 
Can this argumentation be answered in some way? 
In his study about the question of time travel, perhaps the currently 
largest one which considers both the physical, philosophical, literary and 
theological points of view, Paul J. Nahin comes to the conclusion that the 
answer is not actually difficult. 
‗Can the time traveler kill the boy (himself)? As I have argued up to this 
point, the answer is yes, but also that he won‘t because he didn‘t. The fact 
that he won‘t (didn‘t) doesn‘t mean he can‘t (couldn‘t)‘.
7
 
The grandfather paradox appears, according to Nahin, because many 
authors do not take into account the following two elements: First, that it‘s 
one thing to influence the past and another one to change it. Secondly, that 
the past does not occur several times in a time travel situation. In other 
words, the problem appears when time travel is considered as a new 
happening. Thus conceived, it looks like the time traveler could take, in each 
case, a different decision. But a time travel would just be a closed time 
curve, which means, in the block universe perspective, that the line exists a-
temporally, that every instant contains a-temporally all the decisions taken at 
that point, the time traveler decisions included. The past does not occur 
several times, therefore the decisions taken by the time traveler influence 
the course of history, but do not change it. 
In other words, the paradox appears when we mix the idea of time in 
the block universe with the presentist idea, where the only real instant is the 
present. If we accept presentism, a time travel (actually impossible by 
                                                 
7) Paul Nahin, Time Machines (New York: Springer, 1999): 292. The various positions on the 
grandfather paradox and Nahin‘s own position are developed extensively in chapter 4 of this work 
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definition, but let us consider for a moment this ab impossibile situation) 
would be a new occurrence, a recovery of the existence of beings and 
situations which no longer existed. If things would happen again, things 
could happen in a different way, and inconsistencies could appear. But in 
the block universe time travel would not pose these problems, for nothing 
new happens there. 
This reasoning suggests an interesting line of thought. What appeared 
initially as an objection against the time traveler freedom, the grandfather 
paradox, would be nothing else but the confusion between the presentist 
conception of time and the block universe conception. More generally, it 
would be a confusion between an idea of the time which means that existing 
things become real step by step, in a true progression described in terms of 
past-present-future (what philosopher McTaggart called a type A time 
series) and the idea of time as a form of distance within a timelessly existing 
block. From this comes the next question: is it possible that the thesis of the 
inconsistency of free will and the block universe comes from this confusion? 
This thesis, recently assumed by Carl Hoefer, will be described in the next 
section. 
3. Freedom in the block universe, according to Carl Hoefer 
In his interesting paper mentioned above, Carl Hoefer has tried to 
prove that free-will is compatible with the block universe. This assertion is 
rejected by many, because −as is typically argued,− in the block universe 
future actions are completely determined by the cosmic state in the past. 
Hoefer, however, asserts that the preponderant role of the past as the cause 
and determination of everything else has meaning only in a presentist theory 
of time (or one of its variants, such as the ―growing block‖), according to 
which the past existed first. But in the context of the block universe, the 
special role of the past makes no sense, since every instant exists a-
temporally. 
Rather than starting from a first state of the universe which would give 
rise to everything else, Hoefer asserts that, in a block universe, free-will 
means the fact that every free decision co-determines (entails) both past 
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and future states of the universe. Therefore we should not be surprised if 
future events entail present events and vice versa. In some way, all the 
decisions would be decided together. To quote him: 
‗The idea of freedom from the inside out is this: we are perfectly justified 
in viewing our own actions not as determined by the past, nor as 
determined by the future, but rather as simply determined (to the extent 
that this word sensibly applies) by ourselves, by our own wills. In other 
words, they need not be viewed as caused or explained by the physical 
states of other, vast regions of the block universe. Instead, we can view 
our own actions, qua physical events, as primary explainers, determining 
–in a very partial way– physical events outside ourselves to the past and 
future of our actions, in the block.‘
8
  
Once again, the confusion between the presentist conception and time 
in the block universe would generate the appearance of the lack of freedom. 
In this context, we can consider the question of the actual meaning of 
‗co-determination‘. Hoefer explains it thus: The fact that we can and do take 
a decision implies that past states of the universe around us make it 
possible for us to take that decision. Past states that make that decision 
impossible are excluded. Usually the number of past states that entail our 
present decision is very large, and it is precisely this that makes our freedom 
possible. In a similar way, our current decision becomes a part of the set of 
present states of the universe which will entail future states. This entailment 
must not be confused with a causal influence. 
Another interesting idea is the fact that all the entailments coming from 
the past toward the different free decisions taken by billions of human 
beings must be harmonized, and the same must happen with entailments 
toward the future. Obviously again, the past states of the universe must 
make possible, not only the free decision of a single person, but of all of 
them together. 
Thus: Every free decision co-determines (entails) both past and future 
states of the universe. 
                                                 
8) Carl Hoefer, ―Freedom from the inside out‖, Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement Vol. 50 
(March 2002), 201-222. DOI: 10.1017/S1358246100010572.: pp.207-208. 
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However, this proposal would be significantly affected if we could 
prove that, at least in certain cases, the behavior of a person in the future is 
not just entailed by the many states of the universe compatible with it, but 
logically determined by a single component of that set of states: by the 
behavior of the same person in the present. How can we be free, if our 
present behavior can completely determine our future behavior, regardless 
of every other component of the state of the universe, in even trivial 
situations? 
To see that this determination can occur in the context of the block 
universe, we‘ll next pose a thought experiment. 
4. Time travel with decision entanglement 
Let us consider the following two scenarios in a thought experiment: 
1.Scenario 
At 15:55, Max told me: 
„I have just invented a time machine. Do you want to see it?‟ 
Of course, I accepted. At 15:58, Max and I entered the room where the 
machine was. It looked like a simple metal chair. The machinery seemed to 
be located under the seat. 
At 15:59, while Max and I looked at the machine from the room‟s door, 
a second exact copy of it suddenly appeared, just near the first machine. In 
the second machine was seated an exact copy of Max. Amazed, Max and I 
looked at this. 
At 16:00, the original Max crossed the room, sat on the original 
machine, pressed a control and disappeared towards the future. The copy of 
Max, still sitting on the copy of the machine, observed attentively what he 
was doing. 
At 16:01, the copy of Max pressed a control in the copy of the machine 
and disappeared towards the future. Max and the machine never returned. 
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After thinking for some time, I imagined what had happened. At 16:00, 
the original Max travelled to the future in the original time machine, but when 
he arrived he travelled back to the past, arriving at 15:59. After looking at the 
original Max leave on the original time machine at 16:00, he went again to 
the future at 16:01 and never came back. 
2. Scenario 
At 15:55, Max told me: 
„I have just invented a time machine. Do you want to see it?‟ 
Of course, I accepted. At 15:58, Max and I entered the room where the 
machine was. It looked like a simple metal chair. The machinery seemed to 
be located under the seat. 
At 15:59, while Max and I looked at the machine from the room‟s door, 
a second exact copy of it suddenly appeared, just near the first machine. In 
the second machine was seated an exact copy of Max. Amazed, Max and I 
looked at this. 
At 16:00, the copy of Max stood up, went to the original machine, sat 
on it, pressed a control and disappeared towards the future. The original 
Max, near me, observed attentively what he was doing. 
At 16:01, the original Max crossed the room, sat on the copy of the 
machine, pressed a control and disappeared towards the future. Max and 
the machine never returned. 
In this scenario, what had happened was this: at 16:01, the original 
Max travelled to the future in the second time machine. When he arrived, he 
found the first time machine and the second Max awaiting for him there. He 
changed machines and travelled back to the past, arriving at 15:59. After 
changing machines again, he travelled to the future on the original time 
machine at 16:00 and never came back. 
Figure 1 displays the graphical solution to both scenarios in the thought 
experiment. It can be seen that, in the second scenario, the time traveler must change 
time machines in the future, as he did in the past. Otherwise (as shown in figure 2) the 
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situation would become inconsistent, with a copy of the time traveler appearing 
without a cause and living just during a temporal loop. Something similar would 
happen if the time traveler changed machines in the future during the first scenario, 
only in that case it would be a copy of the machine that would appear without a cause 
and remain existent only during a time loop. 
 
Figure 1: What happened in both time-travelling scenarios. 
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Figure 2: Inconsistent solutions for both time-travelling scenarios. 
This has surprising consequences: the behaviors of the time traveler 
during the present and the future are entangled. If Max changes machines in 
the present, he must change machines in the future; if he doesn‘t, he 
mustn‘t. What this means is, the time traveler is not free to act in so simple a 
matter as changing seats or not, for his future behavior is determined by his 
present behavior.  
We believe this thought experiment shows that, in the context of the 
block universe, there are –at least it does not seem to be a-priori impossible 
that there are– events (decisions by supposedly free agents) which are not 
just coordinated with (and partially co-determined by) the rest of the world in 
a general way, but which depend specially and strongly on another event 
(e.g. another apparently free decision) in a different moment of the subject‘s 
history.  
This is not what could be expected in Hoefer‘s context of freedom in 
the block universe. Let us consider, for instance, the following paragraph by 
Hoefer: 
‗If we shake loose from the tendency to see the past as special, when it 
comes to the relationships of determinism, it may prove possible to think 
of a deterministic world as one in which each part bears a determining –or 
partial-determining– relation to other parts, but in which no particular part 
(i.e., region of space-time) has a special, stronger determining role than 
any other.‘
9
 
Of course, our thought experiment does not prove that a particular 
region of space time (the past, for instance) has a special determinant role, 
but it shows that a particular event, in the context of the block universe, 
could ‗co-determine‘ a decision in a strangely strong way. 
Can we argue that this strange ligature is compatible with the adoption 
of a free decision at times linked in this way? It‘s hard to believe. To realize 
the difficulty, consider again the core of Hoefer‘s proposal. 
                                                 
9) Carl Hoefer, ―Causal Determinism‖, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (Spring 2016 
Edition), ed. Edward Zalta, URL: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/determinism-
causal/. (Last time consulted March 2016). 
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That core could be summarized by stating that determinism simply 
provides a logical co-implication network between all the events in the block 
universe, whereby all states of the universe jointly entail one another. But 
this co-implication network does not involve a causal priority of some parts 
over other parts. And so, according to Hoefer, because determinism is 
completely silent on the causal priority of one state of the universe over 
another, it is compatible with determinism that our choices are causal prior 
to our actions.
10
  
However, if we consider the process by which Max takes his decisions 
in each of the critical points in the example we have been considering, it is 
not easy to conceive in what sense could be argued that in the two 
interlaced decision points Max‘s mental deliberation has the causal priority 
over his decisions. 
In other words, the interesting thing about the situation we are 
analyzing in this section is this: in the case of any decision whatever taken in 
the block universe, the constraints affecting the decision are presented, in 
principle, in a somewhat diffuse form. Of course, we accept that everything 
co-determines everything else, but as this is a general statement, we can 
consider the deliberative process at a point in time as a factor in the process 
of co-determination. Then we can, with Hoefer, try to establish our freedom 
of choice in the co-causal power of our deliberations. But in the case of 
Max‘s time-travels, we have two deliberative processes, not just constrained 
in a general way by the rest of the block universe, but each of them entirely 
determined by the other, despite the fact that, if we consider them as 
individual deliberative processes, the decision taken in one of the processes 
need not play a role in the deliberative thoughts that eventually will lead to 
the other decision. If this is so, how can we say that those thoughts are the 
causal key of the decision? 
                                                 
10) Hoefer strengthens this point by appealing to downward causation: mental states can 
downwardly cause physical states. Therefore, as the deterministic network tells us nothing about 
causal priorities, we are entitled to consider that the causes of our actions, regardless of the 
network of logical constraints, are our conscious decisions. 
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Even more: since the strongly entangled decisions in this strange set 
of pairs are not, in principle, different to those other decisions not so 
entangled, the doubt about what is the meaning of freedom of decision in 
the context of the block universe spreads beyond the particular cases of 
correlations like those we have considered in the previous thought 
experiment. If the freedom of some decisions becomes doubtful, the 
freedom of every apparently similar decision also becomes doubtful. 
And the worst is, if the elimination of the presentist intuition (such as 
the priority of the past) cannot guarantee a concept of freedom related to 
what is usually considered a free decision, this insufficiency could also fall 
on Nahin‘s analysis of the grandfather paradox. Would it be enough, to 
guarantee freedom in those situations, to remind us that, in the context of 
the block universe, the event line (and therefore the decision line) exists a-
temporally? How does this argument affect the possible existence, in the 
context of the classic paradoxes, of strongly correlated decisions, in the way 
described in the thought experiment we have formulated? Can we speak of 
freedom with such correlations? 
5. Tentative conclusion  
To finish this discussion, we‘ll pose the following question: From a 
simple exercise of thought, such as the one we have just made, is it actually 
possible to deduce something useful for the discussion about the 
compatibility of free-will with the block universe? 
Of course, the following objection could be made: even if we accept 
the block universe hypothesis, it is possible that time machines cannot exist, 
therefore scenarios as those described here would not be possible. Recent 
results such as Manchak
11 
suggest that there are relativistic space-times 
that make the operation of time machines possible, but our universe 
probably does not comply with the required conditions, or, if it complies with 
                                                 
11) John Byron Manchak, ―On the Existence of ‗Time Machines‘ in General Relativity‖ Philosophy 
of Science, 76 (2009): 1020-1026. 
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them, it could be that they are incompatible with structures such as living 
beings. 
But we believe that this point is not really decisive. To generate 
entangled decisions such as those described here, it is not necessary that 
time travel be a fact. In principle, it would be enough if there are closed time-
like curves (CTC) without human operation in space-time. Up to now, no one 
has found a result that excludes this scenario in a relativistic block universe, 
as ours could be.  
Therefore, asserting that a happy physical combination will always 
prevent, in the block universe, the possible arising of situations that make 
freedom of decision dubious, would not be an approach more plausible than 
insisting that the time traveler will always find obstacles to make decisions 
that would lead to inconsistencies. 
In conclusion, we believe that the compatibility of the block universe 
with freedom in human actions is still at least doubtful, in spite of the recent 
attempts to show otherwise, which we have mentioned in this paper, for the 
consistency of the different events in a block universe could set constrictions 
impossible to accept, starting from a minimally intelligible concept of free-
will.  
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